We scored 73 domains belonging to companies and bodies that sell, standardise or operate digital identity: enterprise single sign-on, identity governance and privileged-access vendors; the zones that serve real sign-in traffic; MFA and hardware-key makers; developer and customer-identity platforms; password managers; identity-verification and national eID providers; and the standards bodies behind FIDO and OpenID. Each was scored on NODA's dual-axis methodology: a Health score for whether the domain's DNS works right now, and a Best Practice score for whether it meets the standards that limit future risk, across 41 checks in five weighted categories.

A note on scope: the list was compiled from well-known vendors and bodies in each sub-group, not from a canonical index of the identity industry, so treat it as a representative sample rather than a census. Only each organisation's apex zone was scored. All 73 domains were checked live on November 7, 2026, between 14:00 and 14:09 UTC, under NODA-v1.0.2. DNS configurations drift, so exact figures will shift over time.

A note on intent

This piece reports the output of a deterministic, published and open technical methodology (NODA-v1.0.2) applied identically to every domain listed. It describes DNS configuration state as observed on the check date only. It is not a judgment of any organisation's products, overall security posture, engineering quality or fitness as a vendor, and nothing here should be read as investment guidance or a claim of financial materiality regarding any publicly traded company named. A score reflects a specific, fixable technical state on a given day, not a permanent verdict. Every domain was scored under the same public rule set, and anyone can run the same 41 checks against their own domain at noda.marinadns.io.

The numbers

MetricValue
Domains scored73
Average Health score97.7 / 100 (median 98)
Health range91 – 100
Average Best Practice score79.3 / 100
Median Best Practice score79 / 100
Best Practice range67 – 100
Zones with a DS record at the parent (DNSSEC signed)24 of 73 (32.9%)
DMARC enforced on all mail61 of 73 (83.6%)

On Health these vendors do very well: all 73 domains are in the Exceptional tier. None runs an open recursive resolver, and none allows a zone transfer to an arbitrary client. The variation sits on the Best Practice axis, where only 7 domains reach Exceptional, 41 are Good and 25 are in Needs Improvement.

The companies whose products decide who gets in mostly publish their own DNS without proof of origin.
Needs ImprovementGoodExceptional05101520707580859095100Best Practice 67: 6 domains — delinea.com, fusionauth.io, hidglobal.com, rsa.com, secureauth.com, strongdm.comBest Practice 71: 16 domains — auth0.com, clerk.com, duo.com, duosecurity.com, hypr.com, itsme-id.com, jumio.com, jumpcloud.com, keycloak.org, microsoftonline.com, protectimus.com, sailpoint.com, stytch.com, token2.com, transmitsecurity.com, withpersona.com16Best Practice 73: 1 domain — onelogin.comBest Practice 74: 2 domains — okta-emea.com, oktapreview.comBest Practice 75: 11 domains — authy.com, frontegg.com, goteleport.com, idsalliance.org, kantarainitiative.org, nordpass.com, onespan.com, onlykey.io, ory.sh, solokeys.com, supertokens.com11Best Practice 79: 1 domain — okta.comBest Practice 82: 5 domains — authelia.com, fidoalliance.org, live.com, saviynt.com, workos.comBest Practice 83: 6 domains — 1password.com, beyondtrust.com, idnow.io, lastpass.com, openid.net, silverfort.comBest Practice 85: 1 domain — ftsafe.comBest Practice 86: 12 domains — dashlane.com, descope.com, entrust.com, forgerock.com, keepassxc.org, keepersecurity.com, login.gov, nitrokey.com, onfido.com, veriff.com, yubico.com, zitadel.com12Best Practice 87: 1 domain — clear.meBest Practice 89: 4 domains — bitwarden.com, cyberark.com, id.me, signicat.comBest Practice 90: 2 domains — pingidentity.com, roboform.comBest Practice 92: 1 domain — proton.meBest Practice 94: 1 domain — imprivata.comBest Practice 97: 2 domains — bankid.com, mitid.dkBest Practice 100: 1 domain — thalesgroup.comBest Practice score
Best Practice scores, 73 domains. Each column is one score value; hover a column to see the domains. Tier bands per NODA §6.4.

The scores bunch at a few values, and the line between those clusters is mostly DNSSEC. Every signed zone scores 82 or higher, and all 37 domains below 82 are unsigned. Signing isn't the only route to a high Best Practice score: pingidentity.com (90) and roboform.com (90) score 90 or above without it, on the strength of everything else. That cuts the other way too. Under NODA, SPF and DMARC count toward Health, not Best Practice, which is why clear.me reaches 87 on Best Practice while publishing neither record; its missing mail authentication shows up in its Health score of 91, the lowest in the cohort.

Signed, half-signed and unsigned

DNSSEC lets a validating resolver confirm that an answer really came from the zone's owner and wasn't changed on the way. It only works if the chain of trust is unbroken: the zone has to publish keys, and its parent has to publish a matching DS record. Without the DS record, validators have no way of knowing the keys are meant to be trusted.

DS at parent (signed)Keys, no DSUnsigned
24
45

24 of 73 zones (32.9%) have a complete chain. Another 4 publish DNSKEY records with no DS at the parent, which leaves their signatures invisible to validators: authelia.com, fidoalliance.org, saviynt.com and workos.com. The remaining 45 (61.6%) aren't signed at all. Every one of the 28 zones that has keys uses an allowed signing algorithm, and every published algorithm is covered by a signature, so where these vendors sign, they sign properly. The gap is that most don't.

The unsigned list includes some of the best-known names in workforce identity: okta.com, auth0.com, pingidentity.com, onelogin.com, sailpoint.com and rsa.com, and Cisco's duo.com and duosecurity.com. Ownership doesn't predict the outcome either: forgerock.com, the brand Ping Identity acquired, is signed; pingidentity.com isn't.

Sub-groupnSignedKeys, no DSUnsignedMedian BPMedian Health
Enterprise SSO / IAM / PAM1841137499
Auth-serving zones51047498
MFA / hardware / FIDO1440107597
Developer / CIAM112277597
Password managers95048699
Identity verification / eID128048699
Standards bodies401378.596.5
SignedKeys, no DSUnsigned
Enterprise SSO / IAM / PAM
n=18
Auth-serving zones
n=5
MFA / hardware / FIDO
n=14
Developer / CIAM
n=11
Password managers
n=9
Identity verification / eID
n=12
Standards bodies
n=4
DNSSEC by sub-group. Bar length is the number of domains. The groups are small, so read them as counts, not percentages.

The identity-verification and national eID group does best: 8 of 12 are signed, including BankID, MitID, login.gov, Onfido, Veriff, IDnow and Signicat. The standards bodies do worst: 0 of 4 have a complete chain of trust. The FIDO Alliance publishes keys but has no DS record at its parent, and the OpenID Foundation's zone isn't signed.

Following the Microsoft login path

An apex score doesn't always describe the hostname users actually sign in through, so we traced both Microsoft sign-in hostnames through a validating resolver (1.1.1.1), checked every zone in the CNAME chain for a DS record, and noted whether the final answer came back authenticated (the AD flag). As a control, login.gov returns the AD flag.

Sign-in hostChainResult
login.microsoftonline.com (Microsoft Entra ID)login.microsoftonline.com → login.mso.msidentity.com → ak.privatelink.msidentity.com → www.tm.a.prd.aadg.akadns.net → A. Zones microsoftonline.com and msidentity.com: no DS.AD flag not set
login.live.com (Microsoft account)login.live.com (zone live.com, signed) → login.msa.msidentity.com → … → A. Zone msidentity.com: no DS, no DNSKEY.AD flag not set

Signing live.com isn't enough on its own. Both chains pass through msidentity.com, which publishes no keys at all, so neither final answer validates. One unsigned zone anywhere in a CNAME chain is enough to break it. (Traced November 5 and re-checked November 7, 2026.)

Mail: mostly enforced, with notable exceptions

Account recovery, password resets and magic links all arrive by email. If a vendor's domain can be spoofed in email, attackers can impersonate that vendor to its own customers however strong its MFA product is. This is where these vendors are strongest.

p=rejectp=quarantinep=none (monitor only)No record
47
16
8
DMARC policy, parsed from each domain's published record.

47 domains publish p=reject and 16 publish p=quarantine. Counting only policies applied to all failing mail, 61 of 73 (83.6%) enforce DMARC. 2 quarantine records don't apply to all mail: forgerock.com sets pct=0 and kantarainitiative.org sets pct=25. 8 domains are in monitoring mode with p=none: fidoalliance.org, idsalliance.org, live.com, onlykey.io, openid.net, signicat.com, token2.com and zitadel.com, among them the FIDO Alliance, the OpenID Foundation, the IDSA and Microsoft's live.com.

No DMARC at all

2 domains publish no DMARC record, and both receive mail: clear.me and solokeys.com. clear.me publishes no SPF record either.

On SPF, 30 domains end with -all and 39 with ~all. With an enforced DMARC policy, ~all is a common and defensible choice, so we don't count it as a weakness. 3 domains hand off to a hosted record with redirect=; NODA follows the redirect and scores all of them as passing, but because their final policy lives in a record hosted elsewhere, we don't count them as either. We found DKIM keys for 49 of the 71 domains that receive mail. NODA can only test common selector names, so not finding a key doesn't mean a domain doesn't sign (§6.3), and we make no claim about DKIM absence.

Top and bottom

Highest Best Practice scores (92 and above):

DomainSub-groupBest PracticeHealthDNSSEC
thalesgroup.comMFA / hardware / FIDO100100Signed
bankid.comIdentity verification / eID97100Signed
mitid.dkIdentity verification / eID9798Signed
imprivata.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM9497Signed
proton.mePassword managers92100Signed

Lowest Best Practice score (67); all 6 domains tied at that score are listed:

DomainSub-groupBest PracticeHealthDNSSEC
delinea.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM6799Unsigned
fusionauth.ioDeveloper / CIAM6799Unsigned
hidglobal.comMFA / hardware / FIDO6797Unsigned
rsa.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM6799Unsigned
secureauth.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM6799Unsigned
strongdm.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM6799Unsigned

Every domain in the bottom group scores 97 or higher on Health. These are zones that work fine today, with headroom against recommended practice rather than active operational risk.

All 73 domains

Each score carries a percentile within this cohort: P80 means the domain scored higher than about 80% of the 73 domains, with ties counted as half (mid-rank), computed separately per axis. Health scores cluster tightly near the top, so a point or two there can move a domain a long way in percentile terms; the Best Practice percentile is the more informative of the two.

73 of 73 domains
DomainSub-groupBest PracticeHealthDNSSECDMARCSPF
thalesgroup.comMFA / hardware / FIDO100 P99100 P97Signedp=quarantine-all
bankid.comIdentity verification / eID97 P97100 P97Signedp=reject-all
mitid.dkIdentity verification / eID97 P9798 P49Signedp=reject-all
imprivata.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM94 P9597 P30Signedp=reject~all
proton.mePassword managers92 P94100 P97Signedp=quarantine~all
roboform.comPassword managers90 P9299 P74Unsignedp=quarantine-all
pingidentity.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM90 P9295 P9Unsignedp=quarantine~all
signicat.comIdentity verification / eID89 P8898 P49Signedp=none~all
bitwarden.comPassword managers89 P8897 P30Signedp=reject~all
id.meIdentity verification / eID89 P8897 P30Signedp=reject~all
cyberark.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM89 P8896 P14Signedp=reject-all
clear.meIdentity verification / eID87 P8491 P1UnsignedNo recordNo record
dashlane.comPassword managers86 P7599 P74Signedp=reject-all
keepersecurity.comPassword managers86 P7599 P74Signedp=rejectredirect=
login.govIdentity verification / eID86 P7599 P74Signedp=reject~all
onfido.comIdentity verification / eID86 P7599 P74Signedp=quarantine-all
veriff.comIdentity verification / eID86 P7599 P74Signedp=reject-all
yubico.comMFA / hardware / FIDO86 P7599 P74Signedp=reject~all
entrust.comMFA / hardware / FIDO86 P7598 P49Signedp=reject-all
zitadel.comDeveloper / CIAM86 P7598 P49Signedp=none~all
descope.comDeveloper / CIAM86 P7597 P30Signedp=reject-all
keepassxc.orgPassword managers86 P7597 P30Signedp=reject~all
nitrokey.comMFA / hardware / FIDO86 P7597 P30Signedp=reject-all
forgerock.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM86 P7596 P14Signedp=quarantine · pct=0-all
ftsafe.comMFA / hardware / FIDO85 P6698 P49Unsignedp=quarantine-all
1password.comPassword managers83 P6299 P74Unsignedp=quarantine~all
beyondtrust.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM83 P6299 P74Signedp=reject~all
idnow.ioIdentity verification / eID83 P6299 P74Signedp=reject-all
lastpass.comPassword managers83 P6299 P74Unsignedp=rejectredirect=
silverfort.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM83 P6299 P74Unsignedp=reject-all
openid.netStandards bodies83 P6298 P49Unsignedp=none-all
live.comAuth-serving zones82 P5498 P49Signedp=none~all
workos.comDeveloper / CIAM82 P5497 P30Keys, no DSp=reject~all
fidoalliance.orgStandards bodies82 P5496 P14Keys, no DSp=none~all
saviynt.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM82 P5496 P14Keys, no DSp=quarantine~all
authelia.comDeveloper / CIAM82 P5495 P9Keys, no DSp=reject-all
okta.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM79 P5098 P49Unsignedp=reject-all
authy.comMFA / hardware / FIDO75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
frontegg.comDeveloper / CIAM75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
goteleport.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject-all
kantarainitiative.orgStandards bodies75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=quarantine · pct=25~all
nordpass.comPassword managers75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject-all
onespan.comMFA / hardware / FIDO75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
ory.shDeveloper / CIAM75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
supertokens.comDeveloper / CIAM75 P4297 P30Unsignedp=reject-all
idsalliance.orgStandards bodies75 P4296 P14Unsignedp=none~all
onlykey.ioMFA / hardware / FIDO75 P4294 P4Unsignedp=none~all
solokeys.comMFA / hardware / FIDO75 P4294 P4UnsignedNo record~all
okta-emea.comAuth-serving zones74 P33100 P97Unsignedp=reject-all
oktapreview.comAuth-serving zones74 P3394 P4Unsignedp=quarantine~all
onelogin.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM73 P31100 P97Unsignedp=reject-all
auth0.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=quarantine-all
duo.comMFA / hardware / FIDO71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
duosecurity.comAuth-serving zones71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
hypr.comMFA / hardware / FIDO71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
itsme-id.comIdentity verification / eID71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject-all
jumio.comIdentity verification / eID71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
jumpcloud.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=quarantineredirect=
keycloak.orgDeveloper / CIAM71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=quarantine~all
stytch.comDeveloper / CIAM71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=quarantine-all
transmitsecurity.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
withpersona.comIdentity verification / eID71 P1999 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
sailpoint.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM71 P1998 P49Unsignedp=reject~all
clerk.comDeveloper / CIAM71 P1997 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
protectimus.comMFA / hardware / FIDO71 P1997 P30Unsignedp=reject~all
token2.comMFA / hardware / FIDO71 P1995 P9Unsignedp=none~all
microsoftonline.comAuth-serving zones71 P1994 P4Unsignedp=reject-all
delinea.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM67 P499 P74Unsignedp=reject-all
fusionauth.ioDeveloper / CIAM67 P499 P74Unsignedp=reject-all
rsa.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM67 P499 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
secureauth.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM67 P499 P74Unsignedp=quarantine~all
strongdm.comEnterprise SSO / IAM / PAM67 P499 P74Unsignedp=reject~all
hidglobal.comMFA / hardware / FIDO67 P497 P30Unsignedp=reject-all

A note on our own configuration

NODA and MarinaDNS aren't exempt from the standard this article applies to everyone else. As of the check date, marinadns.io and noda.marinadns.io are not DNSSEC-signed either; marinadns.io publishes DMARC at p=reject. The fix is the one this article recommends to everyone in it, and it's on our own list.

What to make of it

The companies in this study build products that decide who gets in. The DNS under their own domains mostly works, and their mail policies are mostly in good shape. What's missing in most cases is DNSSEC, the one control that lets everyone else verify that their DNS answers are genuine. That's not proof of compromise, and DNSSEC isn't the only defence against DNS spoofing. But a vendor whose business is proving identity is, in most cases here, publishing its own domain's records without proof of origin.

Turning it on isn't technically hard. Every signed zone in the sample passes both of NODA's signature-quality checks, and for the 4 zones that already publish keys, the missing step is a single DS record at the parent, usually set through the registrar. Keeping it healthy is the harder part: previously we discussed why DNSSEC needs ongoing attention, and why that keeps adoption low.

What to do about it

  • Sign the zones your users actually touch, including every zone in the CNAME chain behind your sign-in hostnames, not only the marketing apex.
  • If you already publish keys, finish the chain: publish the DS record at your registrar, or use CDS/CDNSKEY if your registry scans for it.
  • Move DMARC from p=none to enforcement once reports show your legitimate senders aligned, and drop pct below 100 only as a short ramp.
  • Publish DMARC and SPF even on domains that only receive mail, so nobody can send as you.
  • If you're evaluating an identity vendor, check its domain: the same checks are public and take seconds.

Curious where your own domain lands? Run it through NODA and see the same 41 checks scored live.

⇩ Download full report (PDF, 73 domains)

Method and caveats

Population: 73 apex domains in seven sub-groups; all 73 were assessed without error. Scoring: NODA-v1.0.2; Health and Best Practice are computed separately and never combined. We recomputed every score independently from the published Appendix A weights and matched all 73 stored values. Cross-check: DS, DNSKEY, DMARC and SPF were re-queried for every domain with raw dig against 1.1.1.1 and agreed with NODA on all 73. Version: a first run on November 5, 2026 used NODA-v1.0.1; every figure here comes from the November 7 re-run under v1.0.2, which fixes DMARC and SPF parsing and ASN mapping in the reference engine. DNSSEC findings were identical in both runs. DKIM: a key NODA can't find at the selectors it checks is recorded as Informational, not as absent (§6.3). Scope: apex zones at a single point in time; a score describes public DNS on the check date, not the security of anyone's products. Data: NODA bulk batch identity_provider_v102_2026-11-07.

Fix the gaps this report found

Scored using NODA, a dual-axis DNS Health + Best Practice methodology (41 checks, 5 weighted categories). Read the methodology these scores were produced under: NODA-v1.0.2 Specification.