| Methodology Working Group | Standard ID: NODA-v1.0.2 |
| Category: Standards Track | Status: First Release, Revision 2 |
| Author: MarinaDNS (R. Mastiyev, Editor) | Published: August 2026 Revised: November 2026 |
| Obsoletes: NODA-v1.0.1 Updates: none |
Network Operational Domain Assessment (NODA)
Methodology Specification — Version 1.0.2
Version 1.0.2 (current) · 1.0.1 (archived) · 1.0 (archived) · Revision history
- 1. Abstract
- 2. Terminology
- 3. Conformance
- 4. Scope
- 5. Assessment Methodology
- 6. Scoring Model
- 7. Category Definitions
- 8. Severity Classification
- 9. Report Generation
- 10. RFC Adherence Ledger
- 11. Historical Consistency
- 12. Versioning Policy
- 13. Limitations
- 14. References
- A. Appendix A — Check Catalogue
- B. Appendix B — Scoring Examples
- C. Appendix C — Revision History
- D. Appendix D — Effective Category Shares
1. Abstract
The Network Operational Domain Assessment (NODA) defines a reproducible, quantitative method for evaluating the operational quality, security posture, and technical correctness of a domain's publicly observable Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure. NODA is issued by MarinaDNS as an open, versioned methodology, intended for use by domain operators, researchers, and automated tooling.
NODA produces two independent composite scores per assessment — a Health score and a Best Practice score — rather than a single blended figure. The Health axis measures whether the assessed infrastructure functions correctly and presents no active operational risk. The Best Practice axis measures conformance to recommended standards and hardening practices that reduce future or latent risk. A domain MAY score highly on one axis while scoring poorly on the other; this specification treats that outcome as informative, not contradictory.
This document defines terminology, conformance requirements, assessment scope, the assessment procedure, the scoring formula, category and severity taxonomies, report structure, and the versioning discipline that governs all future revisions of this methodology.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
- Check — a single, deterministic test executed against a domain's public DNS infrastructure, producing exactly one Finding.
- Finding — the output of a Check: a status (Pass, Warning, Critical, Informational, or Not Applicable), together with a human-readable explanation and, where applicable, remediation guidance.
- Category — a grouping of Checks by subject-matter domain (Section 7). Every Check belongs to exactly one Category.
- Axis — a grouping of Checks by the type of quality they measure: Health (current function) or Best Practice (standards conformance). A Check MAY contribute to one axis or be apportioned across both (Section 6).
- Applicability — a fixed property of a Check indicating whether it is Unconditional (always evaluated) or Conditional (evaluated only when a prerequisite record set is present in the target's configuration). A Conditional Check resolves to a Not Applicable Finding when its prerequisite is absent (Section 6.3).
- Composite Score — the weighted aggregate of Finding compliance values within a single axis, expressed as an integer from 0 to 100 (Section 6).
- Report — the complete, immutable output of one assessment, comprising all Findings, both Composite Scores, and required metadata (Section 9).
- Zone apex — the owner name of a zone's SOA record. NODA assesses zone apexes only (Section 5.2).
3. Conformance
An implementation of this methodology is conformant if it satisfies every MUST and REQUIRED provision in this document. Conformance SHOULD be re-verified whenever the implementation is modified. Any system that publishes or displays a NODA score MUST disclose the methodology version (Section 12) under which that score was produced.
This document does not itself constitute a Report. A Report is conformant only if it was generated by a conformant implementation.
4. Scope
The assessment scope of NODA includes: authoritative DNS delegation and glue, zone configuration (SOA, A, MX), email authentication records (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), DNS security extensions (DNSSEC), and operational consistency and resilience signals derivable from public DNS and mail-exchange data.
The following are explicitly out of scope, and their absence from a Report MUST NOT be interpreted as a compliance signal in either direction: internal or split-horizon DNS, registrar account security, application-layer security of hosted services, distributed denial-of-service mitigation, and physical infrastructure security. Assessment MUST NOT extend to non-DNS-observable properties of the target; this boundary exists to prevent lateral assessment drift.
5. Assessment Methodology
This section is procedural. It describes how data is collected and MUST be read independently of Section 6, which defines what the collected data means.
5.1 Design Principles
- Objective — every Check is deterministic; identical infrastructure MUST produce identical Findings.
- Transparent — every Finding that is not a Pass MUST be accompanied by an explanation sufficient for the operator to reproduce the deduction independently. NODA reserves no proprietary or undisclosed scoring logic.
- Actionable — every non-Pass Finding SHOULD include remediation guidance (Section 9).
- Vendor-neutral — Checks are derived from published, open standards, not from any single vendor's implementation.
- Versioned — the methodology evolves under the discipline of Section 12, without invalidating prior Reports.
5.2 Procedure
Assessment of a domain proceeds through four phases, executed in order:
- Validation — the requested name MUST be confirmed to be a zone apex: a lookup of its SOA record MUST return an SOA whose owner is the requested name. A name that is an alias (CNAME), a name inside another zone, a name that does not exist (NXDOMAIN), or a name whose servers cannot be reached MUST NOT be assessed; no Report is produced, and the implementation SHOULD suggest the enclosing zone where one exists.
- Discovery — passive resolution of the domain's authoritative delegation chain via a recursive resolver operated by the implementation. The parent zone is the zone that encloses the domain's parent name, as identified by the SOA returned for that name; the delegation is read from that zone's own nameservers. It MUST NOT be inferred from the label structure of the name.
- Enumeration — collection of the record set relevant to each in-scope Category: NS, SOA, A, MX, TXT (SPF/DMARC), DNSKEY/DS (DNSSEC), and associated mail-exchange authentication records.
- Verification — execution of each Check in Appendix A against the enumerated data, producing one Finding per Check.
Implementations SHOULD query authoritative and recursive infrastructure operated or controlled by MarinaDNS rather than third-party public resolvers, to avoid attributing query load to the assessed domain's infrastructure or violating third-party operator policy. The reference implementation queries a validating recursive resolver operated by MarinaDNS, and the assessed zone's own authoritative servers directly. When the MarinaDNS resolver returns no response at all, it falls back to public resolvers (1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8).
Lookup outcomes. Every lookup has one of five outcomes: an answer; no data (the name exists, the record type does not); name does not exist; server failure; or no response. Only the first three are evidence about the zone. A lookup that ends in server failure is retried once. A lookup that still fails, or that receives no response, is a lookup failure. A lookup failure MUST NOT be treated as evidence that a record is absent (Section 6.3).
DNSSEC validation failure. If the apex SOA lookup fails with a server failure at the validating resolver but succeeds when repeated with the Checking Disabled bit (RFC 4035 §3.2.2), the zone's DNSSEC chain of trust is bogus. The DNSSEC Check then resolves to Critical (Appendix A.2), the Report is flagged accordingly (Section 9), and all remaining lookups for that assessment are made with the Checking Disabled bit, so that the other Checks evaluate the zone's actual records rather than reporting them absent.
NODA checks may be initiated through noda.marinadns.io directly, or through other MarinaDNS-family front-ends that query the NODA API on the operator's behalf. Regardless of origin, all checks run against the same scoring engine and are logged to a single, canonical dataset — results and methodology are identical across every surface.
6. Scoring Model
NODA computes two independent Composite Scores per Report: a Health score (H) and a Best Practice score (B). The two scores MUST be reported independently and MUST NOT be blended into a single figure at any stage.
Each Check i is assigned four fixed properties, published in Appendix A: a Category weight wᵢ (Section 7), an axis allocation pair (hᵢ, bᵢ) where hᵢ + bᵢ = 1 — except for Checks designated Informational-Only (Appendix A.6), which carry no axis allocation and are permanently excluded from both Composite Score formulas — an Applicability designation (Section 6.3), and a compliance function that maps its Finding status to a value Vᵢ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}: Critical = 0, Warning = 0.5, Pass = 1. Findings of status Informational or Not Applicable are excluded from scoring entirely; the two statuses are excluded for distinct reasons and MUST NOT be conflated in a Report's presentation layer — Informational denotes a Finding that was evaluated and found to carry no scoring weight, while Not Applicable denotes a Check that was not evaluated at all because its prerequisite condition was not met (Section 6.3).
For the majority of Checks, the axis allocation is (1, 0) — Health only — or (0, 1) — Best Practice only. A small number of Checks that measure a refinement of a redundancy signal already captured elsewhere by a baseline existence Check are apportioned across both axes (Section 6.2).
6.1 Composite Formula
B = Σ(wᵢ·bᵢ·Vᵢ) / Σ(wᵢ·bᵢ) [scored over all i with bᵢ > 0]
Both H and B are computed on a 0–1 scale and then expressed as integers from 0 to 100 by multiplying by 100 and rounding to the nearest integer, with halves rounded away from zero. An axis whose denominator is zero has no Composite Score and is reported as Unscored. A Check with a split allocation contributes to both sums simultaneously, weighted by its allocation fraction; this prevents a single underlying signal from being counted twice at full weight on either axis.
6.2 Split-Allocation Rule
A Check that refines a redundancy or diversity signal already captured, at the level of mere existence, by a separate baseline Check MUST be apportioned 30% to the Health axis and 70% to the Best Practice axis. This rule exists to avoid double-counting: the baseline existence of redundancy is already scored in full on the Health axis by another Check, so the refinement Check's contribution to Health is deliberately minority-weighted, while its primary contribution — measurement of standards-conformant redundancy depth — is scored on the Best Practice axis. The 30% Health allocation reflects that concentration of redundant components within a single subnet or autonomous system is itself a correlated-failure exposure at the time of assessment, independent of recommended depth. NS Different Subnets and ASN Diversity, whose baseline existence Check is Nameserver Count (CAT-INFRA), measure distinct failure domains — routing prefix and autonomous system respectively — and are scored independently.
A Check that measures whether a redundancy claim is factually true at the time of assessment, rather than whether it conforms to a recommended depth, is scored on the Health axis only, regardless of its relationship to a baseline existence Check. The distinction is whether the Check answers "does this work today" (Health) or "does this meet a recommended standard beyond bare function" (Best Practice).
6.3 Conditional Applicability
Not every Check applies to every domain by design, not by omission. A domain that operates no mail service has no MX record set to evaluate; this is a legitimate configuration choice under RFC 5321 and RFC 1035, not a deficiency, and MUST NOT be scored as one.
Each Check carries a fixed Applicability designation of Unconditional or Conditional. An Unconditional Check is evaluated for every assessed domain regardless of configuration. A Conditional Check is evaluated only when its declared prerequisite record set is present; when the prerequisite is absent, the Check MUST resolve to a Not Applicable Finding rather than a Critical or Warning Finding, and is excluded from both the numerator and denominator of whichever axis formula (Section 6.1) it would otherwise have contributed to.
This exclusion does not alter the weight wᵢ carried by any other Check: the remaining Unconditional and applicable Conditional Checks within that Category continue to carry the Category's published weight wᵢ individually, and no weight is redistributed to other Categories or Checks. Because wᵢ applies per Check (Section 7), the Category's effective share of the affected axis decreases by the weight of the excluded Checks; this is intended, since a Check that was not evaluated contributes no evidence in either direction.
Within CAT-MAIL and CAT-RELI, the prerequisite for all mail-exchange-dependent Conditional Checks is the presence of at least one MX Record. The MX Records Check itself is Unconditional and MUST treat the deliberate absence of any MX record — including a Null MX record (RFC 7505) — as a valid Pass state, not a failure; its function is to validate the MX configuration if one is declared, not to require that one exist. SPF Record and DMARC Record remain Unconditional irrespective of MX presence: RFC 7208 §10.1 recommends a null SPF policy for domains that send no mail, and an equivalent DMARC policy serves the same anti-spoofing purpose, making both checks independently meaningful on a domain with no mail service at all. DKIM Record is Conditional, since no signing key is meaningful in the absence of an outbound mail path. DKIM selector names are not standardized by RFC 6376 and cannot be reliably enumerated through passive DNS lookup alone; where the DKIM Record Check is applicable but no key is found among the selectors checked, it resolves to an Informational Finding rather than a Critical Finding, since absence of a signature at a guessed selector is not equivalent to a confirmed absence of DKIM signing. The selectors checked are listed in the Finding's explanation in each Report. Because non-detection resolves to Informational, the DKIM Record Check can raise but never lower a Composite Score: two domains with equivalent DKIM deployment may differ in Health score according to whether their selector is among those checked.
Within CAT-SEC, the prerequisite for DNSSEC-dependent Conditional Checks is the presence of at least one DNSKEY record in the assessed zone. The DNSSEC Check itself is Unconditional and evaluates whether a zone is signed at all; Checks that examine the properties of an existing signature — DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing and DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List — are Conditional on that signature already existing, and resolve to a Not Applicable Finding when the zone is unsigned.
The Blacklist Check (CAT-OPS) is Unconditional but evaluates mail-exchange IP addresses only. When no MX Record is present there is no address to evaluate, and the Check resolves to an Informational Finding; CAT-OPS then contributes nothing to the Health axis for that domain.
Runtime Informational outcomes of scored Checks. Besides the DKIM and Blacklist cases above, a scored Check resolves to an Informational Finding, excluded from scoring, in exactly the following situations:
- DNS Parent Sent Glue — no delegated nameserver lies inside the zone, so no glue is required (RFC 9471 §3.1);
- ASN Diversity — fewer than two nameserver addresses could be mapped to an autonomous system;
- A Record IPs Public — the zone apex has no A record, so there is no address to evaluate;
- SOA Serial Sync and MX Consistency — the zone has a single nameserver, so there is nothing to compare;
- SPF Lookup Limit — the domain publishes no SPF record, so there is nothing to count;
- Blacklist Check — no queried blocklist answered;
- Not evaluated — any Check whose input lookup ended in a lookup failure (Section 5.2). If the MX lookup itself fails, MX presence is unknown, and every Conditional (MX) Check resolves to this outcome rather than to Not Applicable.
No Check is omitted from a Report. Any Check that cannot be evaluated MUST appear with one of the outcomes above, and a Report containing any Not evaluated Finding MUST be flagged as incomplete (Section 9).
6.4 Interpretation Tiers
Each Composite Score is accompanied in a Report by an interpretation tier, assigned independently per axis: 90–100 Exceptional; 75–89 Good; 60–74 Needs Improvement; 40–59 Poor; 0–39 Critical. An axis with no Composite Score (Section 6.1) is labelled Unscored. Tiers are a presentation aid derived solely from the integer Composite Score; they carry no scoring weight and do not alter either score. The tier label Critical is distinct from the Critical Finding status (Section 6) and from severity level S1 (Section 8).
7. Category Definitions
Category and Axis are independent dimensions. Category groups Checks by subject matter and carries the fixed weight wᵢ used in Section 6. Axis groups Checks by the type of quality measured, per Check, regardless of Category. The Category named "Operational Best Practices" (CAT-OPS) is a subject-matter grouping and MUST NOT be conflated with the Best Practice axis; a Check in any Category MAY be allocated to the Best Practice axis, and CAT-OPS Checks MAY themselves be allocated to the Health axis.
| Category ID | Definition | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| CAT-INFRA | DNS Infrastructure — authoritative delegation, glue, SOA, and address record correctness | 30% |
| CAT-SEC | Security — DNSSEC and related cryptographic protections | 25% |
| CAT-MAIL | Email Authentication — SPF, DKIM, DMARC presence and configuration | 20% |
| CAT-RELI | Reliability — mail-exchange and nameserver redundancy, diversity, and consistency | 15% |
| CAT-OPS | Operational Best Practices — reputation and operational hygiene signals | 10% |
Category weights sum to 100% and apply identically within both the Health and Best Practice formulas (Section 6.1). Each weight wᵢ is a per-Check multiplier: every Check in a Category carries that Category's weight individually in the Composite Formula. A Category's effective share of an axis is therefore the sum of wᵢ·hᵢ (or wᵢ·bᵢ) over its applicable Checks divided by that axis's denominator, and depends both on the number of Checks the Category contributes to the axis and on which Conditional Checks apply to the assessed domain. The published weights express the relative importance of an individual Check in each Category, not a fixed share of either Composite Score; Appendix D tabulates effective shares for two reference configurations. A Category with no Checks currently allocated to a given axis contributes zero to that axis's denominator and is excluded from that axis's computation, not scored as zero. CAT-OPS currently carries a single Check; additional CAT-OPS Checks are candidates for future MINOR revisions (Section 13).
8. Severity Classification
Every non-Pass Finding MUST be assigned exactly one of the following four severity levels, independent of its axis or Category:
| Level | Label | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | Critical | The Check's failure condition is met in full. On a Health-axis Check this indicates likely active service impact or exposure, and remediation SHOULD be treated as urgent; on a Best-Practice-axis Check it indicates the complete absence of a recommended protection. |
| S2 | Warning | An avoidable operational risk or a departure from recommended practice. |
| S3 | Recommendation | A best-practice improvement opportunity with no current operational impact. |
| S4 | Informational | Contextual observation only. Excluded from scoring (Section 6). |
A Not Applicable Finding (Section 6.3) carries no severity classification and, like Informational, is excluded from scoring. It differs from Informational in that no evaluation of the underlying condition occurred; Informational Findings reflect an observation, Not Applicable Findings reflect a Check that did not run.
Status and severity are distinct properties. Status (Pass, Warning, Critical, Informational, Not Applicable) alone determines the compliance value Vᵢ (Section 6); severity is a presentation label and has no effect on either Composite Score. A Critical status always carries S1 and an Informational status carries S4. A Warning status carries S3 for the following Checks and S2 for all others: Parent NS Records, Nameserver Count, SOA MNAME, SOA Serial Format, WWW Record, DNSSEC, and DMARC Record.
9. Report Generation
A Report MUST be packaged as a single self-contained JSON object and MUST include:
- a Report Identifier;
- the methodology version under which it was produced;
- the full set of Findings, each with its Category, Axis allocation, and severity;
- both Composite Scores, computed independently;
- an incomplete flag, with the list of Checks that were not evaluated and why (Section 6.3);
- a flag stating whether DNSSEC validation failed (Section 5.2).
Any presentation of a Report — web page, embed, or PDF — MUST display the incomplete and DNSSEC-validation-failure flags when they are set.
The Report Identifier MUST be composed of the assessed domain, the ISO 8601 UTC timestamp of assessment, and the methodology version, and MUST NOT be reused. Every non-Pass Finding included in a Report SHOULD carry remediation guidance consisting of a technical explanation, an operational-impact statement, and a step-by-step remediation procedure with references to the relevant standards (Section 14).
Per-Check short-form identifiers are RESERVED for introduction in a future MINOR revision (Section 12) and MAY be added to Report output at that time without altering the meaning or values of any field defined in this version.
10. RFC Adherence Ledger
Independent of the Category and Axis taxonomies (Sections 6–7), every Check in Appendix A is annotated with the specific RFC provisions it verifies, restricted to citations using the normative key words MUST or SHALL (Section 2). This Ledger exists to make each Check's standards basis independently auditable without requiring the reader to trace it through remediation prose.
A citation using SHOULD, RECOMMENDED, or MAY is never listed in the Ledger; such provisions are reflected in remediation guidance (Section 9). The Ledger records normative basis only and does not determine a Finding's status or severity, which are set by each Check's compliance function (Section 6) and the definitions of Section 8; a Check MAY produce a Critical or Warning Finding without a MUST/SHALL citation, and such Checks are recorded in the Ledger as having an operational-practice basis. Where a cited document is advisory in nature rather than a standards-track RFC — as with RFC 5358's guidance on reflector-attack prevention, relevant to the Open Recursor Check — the Ledger records it as advisory and does not treat it as a MUST/SHALL source.
The Ledger is descriptive of the Appendix A Check set and carries no independent scoring weight — it MUST NOT be blended into either Composite Score (Section 6).
11. Historical Consistency
Reports are permanent once issued. A Report MUST render, indefinitely, under the scoring rules of the methodology version recorded in that Report's metadata. A later methodology version MUST NOT be applied retroactively to an existing Report under any circumstance; a domain MAY be reassessed to obtain a new Report under the current version, but the prior Report MUST remain accessible and unaltered.
12. Versioning Policy
This methodology follows Semantic Versioning (SemVer 2.0.0).
- MAJOR — a change to the axis model itself, the Category set, the Composite Formula (Section 6.1), any change to a published property of an existing Check (Category, weight, Axis allocation, Applicability, or compliance function), or a Category weight adjustment. Following the first public Report issued under this methodology, a MAJOR revision MUST NOT be issued more than once per twelve-month period, in order to preserve the comparability of previously published scores.
- MINOR — introduction of a new Check with all of its published properties assigned at introduction. MINOR revisions MUST NOT alter any published property of a Check that existed under the prior version. Because a new Check enters the denominator of each axis to which it is allocated, Composite Scores are directly comparable only between Reports produced under the same MAJOR.MINOR version.
- PATCH — one of two kinds, stated in Appendix C for every PATCH:
- Editorial — clarification, or a change to Report presentation labels, with zero impact on any Composite Score. Reports produced under PATCH versions that differ only by editorial revisions are score-equivalent.
- Conformance — a correction to the implementation so that it conforms to this specification as already published (the Check titles, definitions, Ledger citations, applicability rules and compliance values in force), or a disclosure of behaviour that was in effect but undocumented. A conformance PATCH MUST NOT change any published property of any Check. It MAY change Findings and Composite Scores for some domains. Appendix C MUST list every such change, its reason, and its measured effect on previously issued Reports. Reports on either side of a conformance PATCH are comparable only to the extent Appendix C states.
This constraint is self-imposed and stated here in the same normative terms as the rest of this document; a maintainer bound by a published limit on how often it may revise foundational structure is itself a signal of methodological seriousness, not a limitation of one.
13. Limitations
NODA assesses only publicly observable DNS infrastructure at the moment of assessment. It does not constitute a complete security audit, does not evaluate physical infrastructure or social-engineering vectors, and cannot guarantee protection against vulnerabilities not yet publicly known.
During pre-release drafting, before the first Report was issued under this methodology, six Checks were added to the original catalogue: Open Recursor and AXFR / Zone Transfer (CAT-SEC), ASN Diversity (CAT-RELI), SPF Lookup Limit (CAT-MAIL), and DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing and DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List (CAT-SEC), all catalogued in Appendix A. These additions preceded first release and do not constitute MINOR revisions under Section 12. CAA record presence, IPv6/AAAA availability, and DNS TTL variance remain candidates for future MINOR revisions and have not yet been implemented. At the time of this version's publication, CAT-OPS remains under-populated relative to the other four Categories (Section 7) and is the priority for further expansion.
This version scores the presence of a DNSSEC signature (DNSSEC) and the acceptability of its algorithm (DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List) as separate Checks and does not cap one by the other. A zone signed exclusively with an algorithm prohibited for signing by RFC 9904 may therefore receive a higher Best Practice score than an unsigned zone.
A bogus DNSSEC chain (Section 5.2) makes a zone unresolvable for every validating resolver, which is a Health-axis condition. This version can report it only through the DNSSEC Check, which is allocated to the Best Practice axis, and through the Report-level flag (Section 9); adding a Health-axis resolvability Check requires a MINOR revision. Until then, the Health score of a zone with a bogus chain describes its records as served, not its reachability for validating resolvers.
NS Different Subnets compares the first two octets (/16) of each IPv4 nameserver address; IPv6 nameserver addresses are not yet evaluated by this Check.
Category and Axis assignment reflect an editorial judgment made by the maintainer, published in full in Appendix A, and subject to revision only under the discipline of Section 12.
14. References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names — Concepts and Facilities," November 1987.[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names — Implementation and Specification," November 1987.[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," March 1997.[RFC2181] Elz, R. and Bush, R., "Clarifications to the DNS Specification," July 1997.[RFC2182] Elz, R. et al., "Selection and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers," July 1997.[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)," March 1998.[RFC4033] Arends, R. et al., "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements," March 2005.[RFC4034] Arends, R. et al., "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions," March 2005.[RFC4035] Arends, R. et al., "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions," March 2005.[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol," October 2008.[RFC5358] Damas, J. and Neves, F., "Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks," October 2008. Advisory; not a MUST/SHALL source (Section 10).[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and Hoenes, A., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol (AXFR)," June 2010.[RFC6376] Crocker, D. et al., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures," September 2011.[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and Gieben, R., "DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2," December 2012. Advisory; not a MUST/SHALL source (Section 10). Cited in Appendix A remediation guidance for DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing regarding the disputed scope of multi-signature requirements across zone RRsets.[RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)," April 2014.[RFC7505] Levine, J. and Delany, M., "A "Null MX" No Service Resource Record for Domains That Accept No Mail," June 2015.[RFC7766] Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and Wessels, D., "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation Requirements," March 2016.[RFC9471] Andrews, M., Huque, S., Wouters, P., and Wessels, D., "DNS Glue Requirements in Referral Responses," September 2023.[RFC9904] Hardaker, W. and Kumari, W., "DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process," November 2025. (Obsoletes RFC 8624.)[RFC9989] Herr, T., Ed. and Levine, J., Ed., "Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)," May 2026. (Obsoletes RFC 7489 and RFC 9091.)A. Appendix A — Check Catalogue
The following table enumerates every Check defined under this version. Axis allocation is expressed as Health/Best Practice. Applicability of "Conditional (MX)" denotes a Check that resolves to Not Applicable when the target domain has no MX Records (Section 6.3); "Conditional (DNSSEC)" denotes a Check that resolves to Not Applicable when the target domain's zone has no DNSKEY record. Short-form Check identifiers are reserved (Section 9) and not yet assigned; Checks are referenced by title pending that MINOR revision. Appendix A.6 separately catalogues Informational-Only Checks, which carry no axis allocation and are never scored. The RFC basis column is the RFC Adherence Ledger of Section 10. It cites the specific provision a Check verifies where that provision is a MUST, SHALL or MUST NOT requirement; "normative, pre-RFC 2119" and "normative, no RFC 2119 keyword" mark binding requirements stated in plain wording in documents that predate or deliberately avoid RFC 2119 key words; "Advisory" marks a non-binding source; "Operational practice" marks a Check with no MUST/SHALL basis (Section 10).
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parent NS Records | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| Nameservers Authoritative | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| DNS Parent Sent Glue | 100/0 | Unconditional | RFC 9471 §3.1 (MUST) |
| Same Glue | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| NS Consistency | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| Nameserver Count | 100/0 | Unconditional | RFC 1034 §4.1 (normative, pre-RFC 2119) |
| NS TCP | 100/0 | Unconditional | RFC 7766 §5 (MUST) |
| NS CNAME Check | 100/0 | Unconditional | RFC 2181 §10.3 (normative, no RFC 2119 keyword) |
| NS IPs Public | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| SOA Record | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| SOA MNAME | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| SOA Serial Format | 0/100 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| SOA Serial Sync | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| A Record | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| A Record IPs Public | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| WWW Record | 0/100 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
DNS Parent Sent Glue passes when the parent supplies glue for every delegated nameserver that lies inside the zone. NS Consistency passes when every authoritative nameserver that answers returns the same NS RRset for the zone. NS TCP passes when every reachable nameserver address answers a DNS query over TCP; a failed query is retried once. An address that answers neither over UDP nor over TCP is not counted against this Check (it is reported by Nameservers Authoritative); if no address answers over TCP and none answers over UDP, the Check is not evaluated. Nameservers Authoritative fails when a nameserver answers without the AA flag, or does not respond to two attempts; when no nameserver responds at all, the Check is not evaluated (Section 6.3).
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNSSEC | 0/100 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| Open Recursor | 100/0 | Unconditional | Advisory: RFC 5358 (BCP 140) |
| AXFR / Zone Transfer | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing | 0/100 | Conditional (DNSSEC) | RFC 4035 §2.2 (MUST) |
| DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List | 0/100 | Conditional (DNSSEC) | RFC 9904 §3, Table 2 (MUST NOT) |
DNSSEC passes when a DS record exists at the parent and the zone's chain of trust validates. It resolves to Warning when the zone is unsigned, or when it publishes DNSKEY records but no DS exists at the parent. It resolves to Critical when the chain is bogus (Section 5.2), or when a DS record exists but the zone publishes no DNSKEY. Open Recursor fails when any nameserver answers a recursive query for an unrelated name (www.iana.org) with recursion available and an answer. AXFR / Zone Transfer fails when any nameserver returns zone data for an AXFR request over TCP. In both Checks a server that does not answer the probe is retried once; if it still does not answer but does answer an SOA query for the zone, it is counted as not open. If no server answers at all, the Check is not evaluated (Section 6.3). DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing passes when every algorithm present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset has at least one covering RRSIG over that RRset (RFC 4035 §2.2); a zone signed with a single algorithm therefore passes. DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List resolves to Critical when the apex DNSKEY RRset uses any algorithm marked MUST NOT for signing in RFC 9904 Table 2: 1 (RSAMD5), 3 (DSA), 6 (DSA-NSEC3-SHA1) or 12 (ECC-GOST).
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPF Record | 100/0 | Unconditional — scored even with no MX | RFC 7208 §3.2 (MUST NOT) |
| SPF Lookup Limit | 100/0 | Unconditional | RFC 7208 §4.6.4 (MUST) |
| DKIM Record | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
| DMARC Record | 100/0 | Unconditional — scored even with no MX | Operational practice |
SPF Record.
- The character-strings of a TXT record are concatenated without separators before evaluation (RFC 7208 §3.3).
- An SPF record is a TXT record beginning with "v=spf1" followed by a space or the end of the record, compared case-insensitively (RFC 7208 §4.5).
- The policy is the record's "all" mechanism. Where there is no "all" mechanism, the record named by its redirect= modifier is followed (RFC 7208 §6.1).
- Results:
- -all or ~all → Pass;
- ?all, or neither an "all" mechanism nor a redirect → Warning;
- +all (or a bare "all"), no record, multiple records, or a malformed record → Critical.
SPF Lookup Limit. Counts every evaluation of a lookup-consuming term, including repeated includes (RFC 7208 §4.6.4). It passes at ten or fewer lookups, including zero.
DMARC Record.
- The record is parsed as tag=value pairs (RFC 9989), and only the p tag sets the result.
- Results:
- p=reject or p=quarantine → Pass;
- p=none, or no valid p tag → Warning;
- no record, or more than one record → Critical.
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| NS Different Subnets | 30/70 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| ASN Diversity | 30/70 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
| MX Records | 100/0 | Unconditional — absence of MX is a valid Pass | Operational practice |
| MX Validity | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | RFC 5321 §2.3.5 (MUST NOT) |
| MX Not IP | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | RFC 1035 §3.3.9 (normative, pre-RFC 2119) |
| MX CNAME | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | RFC 2181 §10.3 (normative, no RFC 2119 keyword) |
| MX Consistency | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
| MX Redundancy | 30/70 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
| Duplicate MX IPs | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
| MX IPs Public | 100/0 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
| MX Reverse DNS (PTR) | 0/100 | Conditional (MX) | Operational practice |
ASN Diversity maps every IPv4 address of every nameserver (up to 24, in ascending order) to the origin AS of the most specific announced prefix that covers it. Where two origins announce the same prefix length, the lower AS number is used. It passes when at least two distinct ASes are found.
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blacklist Check | 100/0 | Unconditional | Operational practice |
A.6 Informational-Only Checks (Non-Scored)
Checks in this section are never scored and carry no axis allocation (Section 6). Their Finding status is fixed at Informational by design, regardless of the underlying configuration value observed — this distinguishes them from scored Checks that can sometimes produce an Informational Finding at runtime (Section 6.3). Each entry below carries an informal origin-category tag for grouping purposes only; this tag has no bearing on scoring, since Category weight (Section 7) does not apply to Informational-Only Checks. New Checks MAY be added to this section as a PATCH revision (Section 12), since doing so has zero scoring impact.
| Check | Axis (H/B) | Applicability | Origin Tag | RFC basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOA Refresh | —/— | Unconditional | Infra-adjacent | Operational practice |
| SOA Retry | —/— | Unconditional | Infra-adjacent | Operational practice |
| SOA Expire | —/— | Unconditional | Infra-adjacent | Operational practice |
| SOA Minimum TTL | —/— | Unconditional | Infra-adjacent | Operational practice |
Total Checks defined under this version: 41 (37 scored, 4 Informational-Only per Appendix A.6). Of the 37 scored Checks, 9 are Conditional on the presence of at least one MX Record (8 within CAT-RELI, 1 within CAT-MAIL), 2 are Conditional on the presence of a DNSKEY record (both within CAT-SEC), and the remaining 26 are Unconditional. The 4 Informational-Only Checks are all Unconditional.
B. Appendix B — Scoring Examples
The following worked example illustrates the Composite Formula (Section 6.1) over a representative subset of eleven Checks for a hypothetical domain, example.org. It is illustrative only; a production Report is computed over the full Check set defined in Appendix A. The DNSSEC Finding in this example is Critical, which corresponds to a DS record whose chain does not validate (Appendix A.2); an unsigned zone would instead produce a Warning.
| Check | Category (w) | Axis (h/b) | Finding | Vᵢ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parent NS Records | INFRA (.30) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| SOA Serial Sync | INFRA (.30) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| SOA Serial Format | INFRA (.30) | 0.0 / 1.0 | Warning | 0.5 |
| WWW Record | INFRA (.30) | 0.0 / 1.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| DNSSEC | SEC (.25) | 0.0 / 1.0 | Critical | 0.0 |
| SPF Record | MAIL (.20) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| DMARC Record | MAIL (.20) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| MX Redundancy | RELI (.15) | 0.3 / 0.7 | Warning | 0.5 |
| Duplicate MX IPs | RELI (.15) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
| NS Different Subnets | RELI (.15) | 0.3 / 0.7 | Critical | 0.0 |
| Blacklist Check | OPS (.10) | 1.0 / 0.0 | Pass | 1.0 |
Applying Section 6.1 across these eleven Checks:
B = 0.5025 / 1.0600 = 0.4741 → Best Practice Score: 47
Per the interpretation tiers in Section 6.4, a Health Score of 95 reads as Exceptional — the domain's DNS infrastructure functions correctly with no active exposure among the Checks sampled. A Best Practice Score of 47 reads as Poor — principally driven by the DNSSEC failure and the non-diversified nameserver placement. This is the intended output of the dual-axis model: the domain is not at risk today, but has clear, itemized headroom against recommended standards, and the Report communicates both facts without collapsing them into one number that would obscure either.
C. Appendix C — Revision History
This appendix records every revision of this methodology. Each entry states the revision type under Section 12 and its scoring impact.
| Version | Type | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 (August 2026) | First Release | Initial publication. Archived text. |
| 1.0.1 (October 2026) | PATCH | Editorial revision: Editorial corrections with zero scoring impact; see C.1 and the corrections in C.3. Archived text. |
| 1.0.2 (November 2026) | PATCH | Conformance revision: Implementation corrected to conform to the published specification; behaviours disclosed; factual errors corrected. Changes Findings and scores for some domains; see C.2 and C.3. |
C.1 Changes in Version 1.0.1
- Section 6.1 — Stated the rounding rule used to express Composite Scores as integers, and the Unscored case. Reason: the rule was applied but not documented, which impaired independent reproduction (Section 5.1).
- Section 6.2 — Removed the requirement that the baseline Check be in the same Category, and stated the basis for the 30% Health allocation. Reason: NS Different Subnets and ASN Diversity, whose baseline Check is in CAT-INFRA, did not meet the rule as written.
- Section 6.3 — Corrected the statement that excluding a Conditional Check does not reduce its Category's weight. Reason: under Section 6.1 weights apply per Check, so exclusion reduces the Category's effective share; the formula is unchanged.
- Section 6.3 — Disclosed that the DKIM Record Check can raise but not lower a score, and the Blacklist Check's behaviour when no MX Record exists. Reason: both behaviours were in effect but undocumented. (Corrected in C.3: the DKIM behaviour was not in effect for all Reports issued under version 1.0.)
- Section 6.4 (new) — Published the interpretation tiers used in Reports. Reason: tiers were applied in Reports and referenced in Appendix B but not defined.
- Section 7 — Clarified that Category weights are per-Check multipliers, added Appendix D, and removed text describing the pre-release state. Reason: the previous wording implied fixed Category shares that the Composite Formula does not produce.
- Section 8 — Extended the S1 definition to Best-Practice-axis Checks and stated the mapping between status and severity. Reason: the S1 definition did not describe Critical Findings on Best-Practice-axis Checks, and the mapping was undocumented. (Corrected in C.3: the mapping was not applied to Reports issued under version 1.0.)
- Section 10 — Clarified that the Ledger records normative basis and does not determine status or severity. Reason: the previous wording, read literally, excluded Critical or Warning Findings for Checks without a MUST/SHALL citation, contrary to the Check catalogue.
- Section 12 — Moved Category weight adjustment from MINOR to MAJOR, defined the MINOR constraint in terms of published Check properties, and stated report comparability across versions. Reason: the previous MINOR definition contradicted itself; the policy is made stricter, not looser.
- Section 13 — Recorded that six Checks were added before first release, and disclosed the separate scoring of DNSSEC signature presence and algorithm acceptability. Reason: the previous wording implied MINOR revisions had occurred under version 1.0.
- Appendix A — Stated the pass condition of DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing. Reason: the Check title could be read as requiring more than one algorithm.
- Appendix B — Corrected the Best Practice tier of the worked example from Needs Improvement to Poor, and referenced Section 6.4. Reason: alignment with the tiers applied in Reports.
- Appendix A — Added the RFC basis column, which publishes the RFC Adherence Ledger for every Check. Reason: Section 10 stated that every Check in Appendix A was annotated with the provisions it verifies, but no such annotation was published.
- Sections 13 and 14 — Replaced RFC 8624 with RFC 9904, which obsoleted it in November 2025, and added RFC 1034, RFC 7766 and RFC 9471 as Ledger sources. Reason: RFC 8624 was already obsolete at first release; the new references support the Ledger entries.
- Header, title, and Status of This Document — Version updated to 1.0.1.
None of these changes alters any Check property, any compliance value, or any Composite Score. Reports issued under version 1.0 remain valid and score-equivalent (Sections 11 and 12).
C.2 Changes in Version 1.0.2
Every item below corrects the reference implementation to the specification as already published, or discloses existing behaviour. No published property of any Check — Category, weight, Axis allocation, Applicability, or compliance function — is changed. "Effect" counts are measured over the 1,616 Reports stored when the engine was audited in November 2026 (1,509 under 1.0, 107 under 1.0.1). Counts that require re-parsing raw records (DMARC Record, SPF Record) cover only Reports that stored them; the 1,166 earlier Reports did not, and their effect cannot be measured.
Validation and discovery (Section 5.2)
- Zone-apex validation added. Names that are not zone apexes are no longer assessed.
- Reason: such names produced "No nameservers found" Criticals and silently omitted Checks.
- Effect: 35 earlier Reports (31 domains) assessed non-apex names.
- Parent zone is now discovered, not inferred from label structure (Parent NS Records, DNS Parent Sent Glue, Same Glue).
- Reason: the parent was assumed to be the TLD or one of seven second-level suffixes. This read the wrong zone for, among others, names under gc.ca, nhs.uk, europa.eu and si.edu, and checked gov.uk, gov.br, gov.sg and gov.za against their own nameservers.
- Effect: 74 Reports (69 domains) used a wrong parent zone; false Same Glue Warnings resulted.
- DNSSEC validation failure is detected.
- Reason: a zone with a bogus chain previously received DNSSEC Pass, while every other lookup failed and was reported as missing records.
- Lookup failures are distinguished from absent records (Sections 5.2, 6.3).
- Reason: a timeout or server failure was scored as "record not found".
- Effect: not measurable retroactively; DKIM was observed to change between Pass and Informational within 24 hours on identical infrastructure.
- Responses are read from the answer section only.
- Reason: authority and additional records were treated as answers — for example, a parent zone's SOA was reported as the name's own.
Check logic
- NS Consistency is now evaluated (Appendix A.1).
- Reason: the Check was implemented as an unconditional Pass and never evaluated.
- Effect: 1,577 of 1,577 earlier Findings were Pass by construction.
- DMARC Record parsed by tag (Appendix A.3).
- Reason: substring matching read p=none; sp=quarantine as quarantine, missed legal whitespace (p= quarantine), and passed records with no recognisable policy.
- Effect: 11 Reports (7 domains), in both directions.
- SPF Record parsed by term (Appendix A.3).
- Reason: redirect= was scored as "missing all"; malformed records passed; a valid upper-case -ALL was not recognised.
- Effect: 26 Reports (25 domains) with redirect=; 1 malformed record in stored Reports (italia.it). A second, u.ae, was found in regression testing: its record is split into strings that concatenate to v=spf1mxip4:…, which is not a valid SPF record.
- SPF Lookup Limit (Appendix A.3).
- Reason: a valid record with no lookups, such as the null SPF policy RFC 7208 recommends, was Informational rather than Pass, and repeated includes were counted once.
- Effect: 27 Reports.
- DNS Parent Sent Glue (Appendix A.1).
- Reason: glue for any one nameserver satisfied the Check, and address records in a referral for nameservers outside the zone were accepted as glue. The Check now requires glue for every in-zone nameserver, per RFC 9471 §3.1, and is Informational when no delegated nameserver is in the zone.
- NS TCP (Appendix A.1).
- Reason: only a TCP connection was tested; a DNS query over TCP is now required, per RFC 7766 §5, with one retry.
- Nameservers Authoritative (Appendix A.1).
- Reason: a single unanswered query marked a nameserver lame, and a time-budget cut-off left the remaining servers unchecked but passing. A server is now retried once and reported as not responding rather than lame; if no server responds, or not all were asked, the Check is not evaluated.
- DNSSEC (Appendix A.2).
- Reason: a DS record alone passed; a DS without a DNSKEY, or a bogus chain, is now Critical.
- Effect: no earlier Report affected.
- DNSSEC Algorithm Ban List (Appendix A.2).
- Reason: algorithm 12 (ECC-GOST), MUST NOT for signing in RFC 9904 Table 2, was missing from the implementation.
- Effect: no earlier Report affected.
- DNSSEC Multi-Algorithm Signing.
- Reason: a failure to fetch the signed DNSKEY RRset produced a Critical; it is now a lookup failure. The Critical Findings in earlier Reports (incometax.gov.in, mi.government.bg, zonetransfer.me) were each confirmed genuine: those zones' DNSKEY RRsets are unsigned at their authoritative servers.
- No silent omissions (Section 6.3).
- Reason: Unconditional Checks were left out of Reports when their inputs were missing.
- Effect: for example, A Record IPs Public was omitted from 73 Reports and Same Glue from 51.
- Vacuous Passes removed.
- Reason: Open Recursor, AXFR / Zone Transfer, NS IPs Public and NS TCP passed when no nameserver address had been resolved. Open Recursor and AXFR / Zone Transfer also passed when addresses were known but no server answered. SOA Serial Sync passed when fewer than two servers answered.
- Effect: observed in regression testing on museum.go.kr, whose nameserver ns2.museum.go.kr is an open recursor: the Check passed whenever that server did not answer the probe.
- MX Consistency (Appendix A.4).
- Reason: a nameserver that did not answer was counted as publishing no MX records, producing a false Warning. Unanswered servers are now excluded; with fewer than two answering, the Check is not evaluated.
- Blacklist Check.
- Reason: a blocklist that did not answer was counted as "not listed".
- ASN Diversity (Appendix A.4).
- Reason: two sources of run-to-run variation on identical infrastructure, contrary to Section 5.1. (1) Where an address is covered by prefixes announced from more than one AS, the IP-to-AS service returns one record per prefix in no fixed order, and the first record was used; the most specific prefix is now used. (2) Only the first address returned for each nameserver was mapped, and anycast nameservers return their addresses in rotating order; all addresses are now mapped.
- Effect: not measurable retroactively; observed on mitid.dk (Akamai AS20940 /21 and AS21342 /24) and ftsafe.com (Alibaba AS45102 and AS134963).
Report output (Section 9)
- Every Finding now carries its Axis allocation, as Section 9 already required.
- Incomplete and DNSSEC-validation-failure flags added.
- Informational-Only Checks are no longer shown under CAT-INFRA in PDF Reports.
- PDF score colours now follow the Section 6.4 tiers.
- The PDF note on excluded Checks now states the Section 6.3 rule correctly. It previously repeated the wording that version 1.0.1 corrected.
Document
- Section 14: the DMARC reference is corrected to RFC 9989. Version 1.0.1 cited RFC 9991, which is the DMARC Failure Reporting specification, with incorrect authors and date.
- RFC 7505 added.
- Appendix B: the Best Practice ratio corrected to 0.4741, and the meaning of its Critical DNSSEC Finding stated.
- Sections 2, 5.2, 6.3, 9, 12 and 13 updated as described above.
C.3 Corrections to the Record of Version 1.0
- DKIM Record.
- 206 Reports issued under NODA-v1.0 up to 2026-08-10 18:34 UTC scored DKIM non-detection as Critical (V = 0, Health axis).
- Reports issued under the same version label from 2026-08-10 18:56 UTC scored it as Informational.
- The two Reports issued between those times both found a DKIM key, so they do not show which rule was in effect.
- The statement in C.1 that the Informational behaviour was "in effect" under version 1.0 is therefore incorrect for those 206 Reports. Their Health scores are not comparable with later Reports on this point.
- Under Section 11 the Reports remain as issued.
- Severity mapping. The Section 8 status-to-severity mapping published in version 1.0.1 was not applied to Reports issued under version 1.0. 1,114 of those Reports label Warning Findings S2 where Section 8 specifies S3. Severity has no effect on any score.
D. Appendix D — Effective Category Shares (Informative)
This appendix is informative. For two reference configurations it shows each Category's effective share of each axis: the sum of wᵢ·hᵢ (or wᵢ·bᵢ) over the Category's applicable Checks, divided by the axis denominator (Section 7). Shares are rounded to one decimal place. They describe the Composite Formula and do not modify it. Both configurations assume every Check is scored. In practice DNS Parent Sent Glue is Informational for most zones, because their nameservers lie outside the zone (Section 6.3). That raises the shares of the other Categories slightly.
D.1 MX Records present, zone signed
| Category | Effective share of Health | Effective share of Best Practice |
|---|---|---|
| CAT-INFRA (30%) | 61.9% | 33.1% |
| CAT-SEC (25%) | 7.4% | 41.3% |
| CAT-MAIL (20%) | 11.8% | — (no Checks allocated) |
| CAT-RELI (15%) | 17.5% | 25.6% |
| CAT-OPS (10%) | 1.5% | — (no Checks allocated) |
D.2 No MX Records, zone unsigned
| Category | Effective share of Health | Effective share of Best Practice |
|---|---|---|
| CAT-INFRA (30%) | 75.8% | 56.6% |
| CAT-SEC (25%) | 9.0% | 23.6% |
| CAT-MAIL (20%) | 10.8% | — (no Checks allocated) |
| CAT-RELI (15%) | 4.3% | 19.8% |
| CAT-OPS (10%) | — (Blacklist Check is Informational) | — (no Checks allocated) |